

# Secretary Problem.

Note Title

2/19/2013

- Sequence of secretaries,  $s_i$  for  $i=1..n$ .  
  $\exists$  a preference order,  $\sigma: [n] \rightarrow \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$
- When  $s_i$  arrives, see "if  $\sigma(s_i) \leq \sigma(s_j) \forall j=1..i-1$ "  
 "best so far" (BSF)
- decide "hire" or "no hire" irrevocably.
- Assume  $s_i$ 's arrive in a random order.  
  $\equiv$  assuming  $\sigma$  is a random permutation.
- Maximize probability of hiring best secretary.

Alg: - parameter  $r$ .

For  $i=1..r$

- never hire  $s_i$

For  $i=r+1..n$

- hire  $i$  if  $i$  is best so far

$$ALG_r = \Pr[\text{hire } \sigma_i] = \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid \sigma_i = s_i] \Pr[\sigma_i = s_i]$$

$$\Pr[\sigma_i = s_i] = \frac{1}{n}, \quad \forall i \leq r, \Pr[\text{hire } s_i] = 0.$$

$$\text{if } i > r \quad \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid s_i = \sigma(i)] = \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid s_i \text{ is BSF}]$$

$$= \Pr[\text{not hire } s_1, \dots, s_{i-1}]$$

$$= \Pr[\text{not hire } s_{r+1}, \dots, s_{i-1}]$$

$$= \Pr[r+1, \dots, i-1 \text{ are not BSF}]$$

$$= \Pr[\text{best in } 1..i-1 \text{ lies in } 1..r]$$

$$= r/(i-1).$$

$$ALG_r = \frac{r}{n} \sum_{i=r}^n \frac{1}{i}$$

$$= \frac{r-1}{n} \left[ H_{n-1} - H_{r-1} \right]$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{r}{n} \log_e \frac{n}{r}$$

$$\frac{dALG}{dr} = \frac{r}{r} \cdot \frac{-1}{r} + \frac{1}{n} \log_e \frac{n}{r} \Rightarrow 0$$

$$\frac{n}{r} = e$$

$$\therefore ALG = \frac{1}{e}$$

Is this optimal?

Consider any possibly randomized mechanism.

Let  $p_i = \Pr[s_i \text{ is hired}]$  where the probability is over the randomness in the mechanism and the random permutation.

w.l.o.g Assume mechanism hires  $s_i$  only if  $s_i$  is "best-so-far".

$$(1) \quad p_i = \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid s_i \text{ is best so far}] \cdot \Pr[s_i \text{ is BSF}].$$

$$\Pr[s_i \text{ is BSF}] = 1/i.$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid s_i \text{ is BSF}] &\leq \Pr[\text{not hire } s_1, \dots, s_{i-1}] \\ &= 1 - (p_1 + p_2 + \dots + p_{i-1}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\therefore ip_i \leq 1 - (p_1 + p_2 + \dots + p_{i-1})$$

$$E[ALG] = \Pr[\text{hire } \sigma(i)]$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\sigma(i) = s_i] \cdot \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid \sigma(i) = s_i]$$

$$\Pr[\sigma(i) = s_i] = 1/n$$

$$\Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid \sigma(i) = s_i] = \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid s_i \text{ is BSF}]$$

$\therefore$  Algo cannot distinguish between

$\sigma(i) = s_i$  &  $s_i$  is BSF.

$$\text{From (i), } \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid s_i \text{ is BSF}] = ip_i$$

$$\therefore E[ALG] = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{n} ip_i$$

$$\therefore E[ALG] \leq \max \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n ip_i \text{ s.t.}$$

$$\begin{aligned} x_i & \quad \forall i=2 \dots n \quad ip_i \leq 1 - (p_1 + \dots + p_{i-1}) \\ & \quad \forall i=1 \dots n \quad p_i \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Dual:  $\min \sum_i x_i$  s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i=1 \dots n \quad ix_i + x_{i+1} + \dots + x_n & \geq \frac{i}{n}, \\ x_i & \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Dual solution :-

$$nx_n \geq \frac{n}{n} \quad \therefore \text{ set } x_n = \frac{1}{n}$$

$$(n-1)x_{n-1} + x_n \geq \frac{n-1}{n} \quad \therefore \text{ set } (n-1)x_{n-1} + \frac{1}{n} = \frac{n-1}{n}$$

$$\Rightarrow x_{n-1} = \frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{n \cdot (n-1)} = \frac{1}{n} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{n-1} \right] = \frac{n-2}{n \cdot (n-1)}$$

$$(n-2)x_{n-2} + \frac{n-2}{n \cdot n-1} + \frac{1}{n} = \frac{n-2}{n}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \therefore x_{n-2} &= \frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{n \cdot n-1} - \frac{1}{n \cdot n-2} \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{n-1} - \frac{1}{n-2} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} ix_i + x_{i+1} + x_{i+2} + \dots + x_n &= \frac{i}{n} \\ - \left[ (i+1)x_{i+1} + x_{i+2} + \dots + x_n \right] &= \frac{i+1}{n} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow ix_i - (i+1)x_{i+1} = -\frac{1}{n}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow x_i &= x_{i+1} - \frac{1}{ni} \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{n-1} - \frac{1}{n-2} - \dots - \frac{1}{i+1} - \frac{1}{i} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{1}{n-1} + \frac{1}{n-2} + \dots + \frac{1}{i} \leq 1$$

when  $\sigma = ne$ .

$$\therefore x_i = 0 \quad \forall i \leq ne.$$

$$\text{Dual objective} = \sum_i x_i = \sum_{i > ne} x_i$$

$$rx_r + x_{r+1} + \dots + x_n \cong \frac{r}{n}$$

$$x_r = 0. \quad \therefore x_{r+1} + \dots + x_n \cong \frac{r}{n} = \frac{1}{e}$$

Also the  $p_i$ 's corresponding to the algo is

$$p_i = 0 \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, \lfloor ne \rfloor \quad p_i = \frac{r}{i \ln i} \quad \forall i = \lfloor ne \rfloor + 1, \dots, n$$

Incentive Compatibility: No incentive for a secretary to move up/down the order.

$\Rightarrow \Pr[\text{hire } s_i]$  is the same for all  $i = 1, \dots, n$

No longer true that only hire  $s_i$  if it is BSF.

$\therefore$  Let  $f_i = \Pr[\text{hire } s_i \mid s_i \text{ is BSF}] = \Pr\left[\frac{\text{hire } s_i}{s_i = \text{BSF}}\right]$

$$p = \Pr[\text{hire } s_i] \geq f_i \cdot \frac{1}{n}$$

$$f_i \leq 1 - (i-1)p$$

$$p \leq \frac{1}{n}$$

$$\max \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{n} f_i$$

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Given  $p$ , set  $f_i = \min\{ip, 1 - (i-1)p\}$

$$ip = 1 - (i-1)p \Rightarrow 2ip = 1 - p$$

$$\therefore i = \frac{1-p}{2p} = \frac{1}{2p} - \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\therefore f_i = \begin{cases} ip & \text{if } i \leq \frac{1}{2p} - \frac{1}{2} \\ 1 - (i-1)p & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$$

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Mechanism:-

Let  $i \leq \frac{1}{2p}$ , if you reach  $s_i$ , &  $s_i$  is BSF, then hire  $s_i$  w.p.

$$f_i / [1 - \Pr(\text{reach } s_i)] = f_i / [1 - (i-1)p]$$

$$\frac{f_1}{1 - (r-1)p} = \frac{ip}{1 - (r-1)p} = \frac{i}{\frac{1}{p} - r + 1}$$

for  $i > \frac{1}{2p}$ , hire w/ some probability even if not BSF.

